Canucks Young Guns

[Ronning's Ghost]

Is/was Miller and Horvat a strong enough duo to win a Cup with? Probably not. They might have been enough to get you there, but looking at the last 30 years, the number of teams that have won the Cup with centres outside the top 10 is exceedingly low...

Not that I really disagree with you, but wasn't this past season another example of a team winning it without a true elite center? Aho, Stankoven, and Staal worked pretty well as quality in numbers.

I was going to add Aho as an example, but I didn't watch any of these last playoffs. So I agree, I think you could add Carolina probably both times they won the cup.

Not many teams have ever had what they had this year though, ie three super premium #2 centers. Something like that is likely to work more times than not if you can put it together. Again, I basically agree with your point.

This fun for me, because it touches on a topic I enjoy, but few here care to discuss very often, at least with respect to a deliberate plan: roster construction and cap allocation.

Could the Canucks be looking at three premium #2 centres? Rossi, Cootes, and Malhotra?

My suspicion is that such a roster is actually easier to put together (and fit under a cap) than a 1 -2 centre punch like McDavid and Draisaitl.

[5thhorseman]

Isn't that because McDavid and Draisaitl.are actually a 1-1 centre punch?

[UWSaint]

This fun for me, because it touches on a topic I enjoy, but few here care to discuss very often, at least with respect to a deliberate plan: roster construction and cap allocation.

I agree that the topic is interesting.

Here's the way I see it very generally:

(1) All winning teams need above average talent on their rosters. This is a team's core. (St. Louis was arguably an exception to this rule).
(2) Rosters and team identity should be constructed around the core, to accentuate, complement, and sometimes make up for deficits without sacrificing identity.
(3) The corollary to the above is that the core isn't acquired because they fit a pre-conceived notion of team identity. It is really hard to find special players, and beggars can't be choosers. The exception to this is when there is an established core and you are adding a final member who is going to slide into an established system.
(4) This might be summarized as follows: your core players will have specific attributes. To construct a roster, you must understand what those attributes are, and build an identity that maximizes their effectiveness. And that's all right because....
(5) There is no single blueprint for success in the NHL. In recent seasons, the Stanley Cup has been won by teams with different styles. Florida and Carolina have several similarities -- the most significant to me is how relentless they play, but the way they play relentless is quite different and defines them. Florida relies on physicality (not just hitting, but using bodies to take away space without the puck and create space with the puck), always on the line. Carolina speed and indefatigability. Both styles require depth. Florida's game requires above average size, Carolina's game can be played with below average size (at least in the forward group). Florida's game as a team looks more like Barkov; Carolina's looks more like Aho -- they built identities on the players who emerged to be their important players. But go back a few years and the Cups were won by teams defined by their enviable top of the line up skill and the ability of the best defensemen to eat up most of the game (Tampa, Colorado).
(6) A review of recent winners also suggests something quite obvious -- the less "top of the league" your top end talent is, the deeper you have to be. Depth opens up effective style options, and makes finding complements who can play that way really important. Extraordinary high end skill (ideally without glaring weak spots) is a cheat code to being successful, but it brings with it bigger cap hits and less flexibility to build complements. And if those top players flame out, there's nowhere to go.

I think the above holds true with not only styles, but also positions. You can win from the net out, you can win with center depth. And you can lose with each strategy. I agree wings are far less important as a general rule than centers, defensemen, and goalies, but goalies are nearly impossible to project at 18 and defensemen are somewhat hard to project, so that nudges rebuilding through the draft teams to grab centers. My view--when the slate is blank, just get talent and refine from there.

[Lancer]

It's the Carolina model, and I think it's one of the more sustainable models.

(3) The corollary to the above is that the core isn't acquired because they fit a pre-conceived notion of team identity. It is really hard to find special players, and beggars can't be choosers. The exception to this is when there is an established core and you are adding a final member who is going to slide into an established system.

Talent at the draft is talent, and I subscribe to the BPA. That said, if management has an identity or a style of play they want their team to adopt, and one of their 'special/core players' isn't fitting that mold, there's nothing saying they can't trade that 'special/core player' for a player who fits their mold better - perhaps take some picks and prospects depending on how much runway management has in a rebuild. Pump and dump the kid for a better fit - either now or in the near future. The risk is the time lost in a team's development if you go the picks and prospects route.

[Cornuck]

Where do you see "chemistry" in terms of importance? I think Florida and Carolina also had that mixture of players who were playing for each other and added a few points to their makeup.

One thing that makes winning the Cup unique is that it is a long slog unlike any other in pro sports. Luck is also a big factor. Injuries, hot goalie, schedule - which can disrupt even the best teams.

With the rising cap, it's going to be interesting to see what the next few Cup winners look like. Will there be the switch back to high-end talend leading the way - or will it be a strong lineup and down the roster that marks success?

[UWSaint]

Talent at the draft is talent, and I subscribe to the BPA. That said, if management has an identity or a style of play they want their team to adopt, and one of their 'special/core players' isn't fitting that mold, there's nothing saying they can't trade that 'special/core player' for a player who fits their mold better - perhaps take some picks and prospects depending on how much runway management has in a rebuild. Pump and dump the kid for a better fit - either now or in the near future. The risk is the time lost in a team's development if you go the picks and prospects route.

I don't disagree that sometimes you progress with the BPA and that player isn't fitting the mold that is developing around your draft pick. Florida moved on Huberdeau (and after a President's Trophy, IIRC), not because Huberdeau wasn't effective, but because they were forming their mold around Sasha.

Where I do take issue is identifying the style before having things far enough developed with an emerging core to have that style built around the growing talent. Don't think "we need to play big" and bypass a clear smaller BPA early in the draft (where there are more meaningful marginal quality differences) when you don't really know how you need to play because the special talent isn't developed enough or numerous enough.

[UWSaint]

Where do you see "chemistry" in terms of importance? I think Florida and Carolina also had that mixture of players who were playing for each other and added a few points to their makeup.

One thing that makes winning the Cup unique is that it is a long slog unlike any other in pro sports. Luck is also a big factor. Injuries, hot goalie, schedule - which can disrupt even the best teams.

With the rising cap, it's going to be interesting to see what the next few Cup winners look like. Will there be the switch back to high-end talend leading the way - or will it be a strong lineup and down the roster that marks success?

All teams that win have chemistry because winning is evidence of chemistry....

I don't put a ton of stock into that intangible term, yet at the same time, I can't deny that Hank and Dank had something with one another that went beyond their big brains and great hands. But setting aside these aliens, I think that "chemistry" is something that comes from three things: (1) knowing the expectations (playing to the style of the line/team in the role the line has for you), (2) hockey iq, and (3) ensuring the lines are balanced to fit the needs of the line (e.g., don't put three Henriks on the same line, don't couple a sniper with two guys that play with their head down). I think that Carolina and Florida are really well coached teams, and a good deal of the above has to do with coaching decisions and communication. On the other hand, Kuzmenko and EP40 can have great chemistry under Boudreau and before Tocchet wants to make every player into his image; they have shitty chemistry in Kuzzy's second year where Kuzzy's assigned the role of forechecker. That kind of thing.

As for the effect of the rising cap, I don't think that it will change too much whether high talent or depth will be preferred. I think that is almost a where you sit is where you stand decision. If you are fortunate to draft a Celebrini, you will pay out your nose for him and that has downstream effects. I do think that the rising cap, however, will enable already nearly established teams with longer term contracts signed before agents figured out the future to stretch their talent further. Guys signed before the bull market have gotten more valuable, and so there are going to be higher end players on principal complementary player salaries. Montreal is sitting very very pretty.....

[Lancer]

Where I do take issue is identifying the style before having things far enough developed with an emerging core to have that style built around the growing talent. Don't think "we need to play big" and bypass a clear smaller BPA early in the draft (where there are more meaningful marginal quality differences) when you don't really know how you need to play because the special talent isn't developed enough or numerous enough.

Yeah, I think you misunderstood me. Even if the team wants to adopt a 'Big Boy' style of hockey, they should still take BPA unless it's a relative coin-toss between a kid who plays the style they want vs the one who doesn't. If the prospect can adjust to playing that style, great. If not, it would behoove management to move on from him before too long. Depends on what direction and guidance management gives to the scouting department.

Assets are assets, whether they fit as core pieces or not.

I think the Huberdeau trade was exactly a case of that. Evidently management figured Huberdeau wasn't going to fit as part of the core moving forward so they were comfortable ditching him for Tkachuk. They had to have Huberdeau in the first place, though, to get Tkachuk.

The lesson I'm taking on this matter is take BPA - if not to put in your core, then to have as a trade piece to get someone to form part of your core. Don't fall in love with every highly-drafted prospect.

[Ronning's Ghost]

Talent at the draft is talent, and I subscribe to the BPA. That said, if management has an identity or a style of play they want their team to adopt, and one of their 'special/core players' isn't fitting that mold, there's nothing saying they can't trade that 'special/core player' for a player who fits their mold better - perhaps take some picks and prospects depending on how much runway management has in a rebuild. Pump and dump the kid for a better fit - either now or in the near future. The risk is the time lost in a team's development if you go the picks and prospects route.

I don't disagree that sometimes you progress with the BPA and that player isn't fitting the mold that is developing around your draft pick. Florida moved on Huberdeau (and after a President's Trophy, IIRC), not because Huberdeau wasn't effective, but because they were forming their mold around Sasha.

Where I do take issue is identifying the style before having things far enough developed with an emerging core to have that style built around the growing talent. Don't think "we need to play big" and bypass a clear smaller BPA early in the draft (where there are more meaningful marginal quality differences) when you don't really know how you need to play because the special talent isn't developed enough or numerous enough.

I think that Lancer is right that in theory (in any CBA/cap environment wherein trades are possible) a team could be built to a pre-determined blueprint, but UWSaint is right that in practice, they almost never are. Instead, the rest of the team is just built around the overall best (without reference to play style) core that a team can acquire. I think that in the NFL, it is usually the opposite, with the fairly frequent exception of the quarterback position.

And I think this is why these discussions seldom get traction on this board, because they are largely theoretical. So the closest we get to a blueprint from a GM is "meat and potatoes", and that same GM then proceeds to draft Pettersson and Hughes, who -- whatever their other virtues -- offer little of either. And I am not complaining about either of those drafts ! Everyone on this board knows I have my issues with Benning's administration, but full credit for correctly identifying the BPA still on the board -- probably in the entire draft -- with Hughes. (With respect to Pettersson, while there are centres taken later that I would rather have today, on draft day, Pettersson was the best player still on the board. The mistake was not selling high on an asset for which depreciation could be reasonably predicted.)

But if the Canucks' new management team is an exception, and any of you have heard of any of them describe a blueprint, I'd love to discuss it. Otherwise, if we get another draft day like we had in '26, I think we can make at least one clear inference.

[UWSaint]

(Lots of good stuff….)

Otherwise, if we get another draft day like we had in '26, I think we can make at least one clear inference.

The inference being the Canucks are going to be the first to have 5 forward lines and 3D?

[Lancer]

Without rehashing the failures of past management regimes, one of the key failures that this discussion touches on (and that RG mentions above) is management's lack of courage to 'sell high' on young prospects or members of their core. There are counter-arguments to 'selling high': "the team that gets the best player wins the trade"; "management had no patience with the kid, and now look at him (if he blossoms further elsewhere)". That said, if a management team has a vision for the type of team they want, and don't believe the kids they drafted - no matter how high - are going to fit into that vision, then it's defensible to trade them while their stock is still high.

The biggest example of that is Pettersson. It's one thing for Benning to hang on to the Dickless Swede - even when the kid was the 'new hot thing' in the market - even if Benning wanted a 'meat and potatoes' team. Then again, Pettersson was the first real draft 'hit' that super-scout Benning got, so he may have been reticent to part with his first potential 'core' player. Baldy and Old Fart then compounded the problem by thinking they could get him to fit in to the mold they were trying to build around Miller (over Horvat) and Hughes vice turfing him after the 23-24 season - and then signing him to his current contract.

That would be the counter-argument to the "build your team around the core you happen to find in the draft" approach. They tried to build around Pettersson as well as Hughes. The present state of the team shows how that went.

[Ronning's Ghost]

(Lots of good stuff….)

Otherwise, if we get another draft day like we had in '26, I think we can make at least one clear inference.

The inference being the Canucks are going to be the first to have 5 forward lines and 3D?

There was no smiley or winky, so just in case you were serious:

Beef. The draft picks seemed to indicate that management wanted to ice a big team.

An alternative explanation would be that in their first draft as a management group, and the first draft of a re-build, they just wanted to maximize their chances to come away with any assets at all from each draft pick. They calculated that there would always be a market for a big guy who could skate, and so predicted a higher floor for late round picks with size and skating ability. With respect to your observation that they drafted more forwards than D, I also note that, consistent with my "just get something from the pick" theory, projecting the career potential of 18 year-old forwards is generally considered easier than for defencemen.

That's why I want at least one more draft before I conclude that it's the size itself they value, and not just a way of hedging their bets. Drafting some small-but-speedy skilled guys would be enough to indicate that they weren't focused on icing a bigger-than-average team, but continuing to draft big guys in mid to late rounds would still be consistent with the idea that they believed that this approach just provided their best chance to come away with some kind of NHL asset with later round picks.

(A considerably less likely possibility is that they have reading my posts here, and were seeking raw material to mold into Deterrents.)

Note that this is the opposite of what I took Benning's drafting philosophy to be, which was to draft for skill, and then hire size as needed later.

Also: I was pleased to read one CC's better posters thought my post contained good stuff. I am keenly aware that my hockey knowledge is the lowest on this board, and worry that many of my posts are considered just not relevant.

[Ronning's Ghost]

Without rehashing the failures of past management regimes, one of the key failures that this discussion touches on (and that RG mentions above) is management's lack of courage to 'sell high' on young prospects or members of their core. There are counter-arguments to 'selling high': "the team that gets the best player wins the trade"; "management had no patience with the kid, and now look at him (if he blossoms further elsewhere)". That said, if a management team has a vision for the type of team they want, and don't believe the kids they drafted - no matter how high - are going to fit into that vision, then it's defensible to trade them while their stock is still high.

The biggest example of that is Pettersson. It's one thing for Benning to hang on to the Dickless Swede - even when the kid was the 'new hot thing' in the market - even if Benning wanted a 'meat and potatoes' team. Then again, Pettersson was the first real draft 'hit' that super-scout Benning got, so he may have been reticent to part with his first potential 'core' player. Baldy and Old Fart then compounded the problem by thinking they could get him to fit in to the mold they were trying to build around Miller (over Horvat) and Hughes vice turfing him after the 23-24 season - and then signing him to his current contract.

That would be the counter-argument to the "build your team around the core you happen to find in the draft" approach. They tried to build around Pettersson as well as Hughes. The present state of the team shows how that went.

I think that the limitation of the "plan the team first, find players that fit second" approach is that it assumes a certain fungibility of hockey talent -- that a team can reliably flip a talented player who doesn't fit their blueprint from a roughly equally valuable collection of assets that do (or, if some of those assets are picks, still might), as you (and I) would have preferred to see with Pettersson. Recall that there have been periods in the league wherein it was virtually impossible to make trades.

Or to pick a Canucks example, consider the Sedins. I find it unlikely that Brian "truculence" Burke would have drawn up a team built around two highly-skilled but slow and non-aggressive Swedes as his first choice. But they were far and away the Best Players Available in the draft when the Canucks finally had a high pick. Then, by the time their value was evident to the rest of the League, they were signed to contracts that:
1) had no movement clauses, (which were reflected in the discount they took from maximum market value) and they liked it here, and they liked playing together
1) were still (justifiably !) very expensive, such that it would have been extremely difficult for another team to fit them both under the cap

But that was the past. UWSaint maintains that one of the consequences of a rising cap is that trades get a lot easier to manage. I would be interested to see a team use that opportunity to take the approach you describe.

I think that the "3 top quality #2 centres" approach that Megs described is a promising, both in terms of on-ice effectiveness, and in terms of achievability with respect to talent availability and cap management. Whether by happenstance or design, the Canucks might be going this route.

If hockey talent truly is fungible in the League over the course of the Canucks rebuilt, how would you like to see resources allocated with respect to wingers, defence, and goaltending?